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I.
THE FORMULATION and execution of fiscal policy means the realiza-
tion of economic objectives within a political context. This involves the
consideration of what is economically sound in relation to what is politi-
cally feasible. In analyzing the political factors in such a situation three
aspects call for examination: first, the underlying interest groups; second,
the current slogans, creeds and symbols used in the defense or promotion
of these interests; and third, the framework of existing governmental
institutions through which social forces and ideas must operate. We
must distinguish between (a) argumentation as a way of securing sup-
port through conversion and (b) argumentation as a logical analysis of
relationships. Both are based upon value judgments, but in the first
instance argument is used to promote these values; in the second instance
the values are assumed in the premises from which the argument pro-
ceeds. Thus, economic theory can be used objectively within, for example,
the framework of assumed principles called "capitalism."
In all policy formation there is a plane of discussion distinguishable
from the actual individuals and groups in conflict. Hence both the lan-
guage of debate and the debaters themselves can be examined. The
latter speak for their followers - as a group what do they stand for,
who are their leaders, how are they organized? How is the status of
a group affected by a given policy? What is the reaction of the group
to the policy? Both the objective effect and the subjective reaction must
be considered. What does the farmer want, or the investment trust, the
taxpayer, or the banker? The diversity of any society may be due to
conflicting economic interests or the result of differing dogmas that
separate men whose welfare is otherwise closely entwined. The political
task of compromise is none the less difficult though these differences be
psychic rather than material. Not only the diversity of political demands
but also their intensity must be considered.
The question of what fiscal policy should be, although posed on the
discussion plane in terms of the general welfare, is usually answered
as a political issue on the level of what particular groups demand. The
politician is, of course, not limited merely to such demands in the formu-
lation of policy; but reckon with them he must. They form the sub-
stance from which new policy is chiefly wrought.
Political demands must also be related to the general pattern of values
accepted by the community. Harmony with well-established traditions
tAssistant Professor of Government, Harvard University.
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and attitudes vastly strengthens a new proposal. Yet it is difficult to
see how in any analysis of fiscal policy formulated for the general wel-
fare we can get away from the interest of some group or groups as the
basic criterion. Decision depends upon the segment of the population
to be preferred. Can the consumer's interest be taken as the basic cri-
terion? Even if this were entirely defensible from an economic viewpoint,
it would be unrealistic for political analysis. Neither is the welfare of
the community wrapped up in that of the taxpayer. Moreover, both tax-
payer and consumer interest are notoriously weak in the political realm.
Hence the political process results in the identification of the interests
of the more powerful elements with the general welfare. This identi-
fication, however, is seldom simple and direct. It is colored by the pre-
vailing climate of opinion; it is affected by the existing institutions and
by the skills of rival politicians.
Our society seems to require discussion in terms of a broad interest
even when narrow ends are being served. Thus much economic and
political theory is used for the defense or rationalization of a group
interest in the terms of the general welfare. Even though some par-
ticular group interests may quite convincingly, from an economic point
of view, be identified with a broad public interest, the prevalent political
ideology and habits of thought dictate a more circuitous approach.
The reasoning used in approaching such a problem is illustrated in
the report of the British Committee on Expenditures.' This committee,
composed of distinguished public men, studied the fiscal problems facing
the British government and attempted to make recommendations. The
group split into two irreconcilable parts. The majority criticised the
post-war tendency of electing to parliament candidates pledged to ex-
penditure schemes.
"The electoral programme of each successive part), in power," the
Committee stated, "particularly where it was formerly in opposi-
tion, has usually been prepared with more regard to attracting elec-
toral support than a careful balancing of national interests. When
the time comes to put that programme into force, matters which had
formerly appeared easy and attractive are found to involve such grave
questions as whether the proposals are administratively possible,
whether they will have the desired results, whether the country can
bear the cost; whether, in short, they are really in the national
interest." 2
By what standards should a government attempt this "careful balanc-
ing of national interests?" The substantive meaning of these words is
more clearly revealed in the concrete recommendations of the report.
1. COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL EXPENI)rruRE, REPORT (1931).
2. Id., at 223.
19381
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
"The first thing needful is to secure. a return to general prosperity,"
argues the Committee.3 Government action has in effect added to the
economic burdens of the nation. Hence, the national welfare will be
best promoted by the curtailment of governmental activities. Tliose of
most "rapid and recent growth" should be selected for reduction. The
Committee offered three reasons:
"First, the older commitments of the state have stood the test of
many attacks and in the main have proved that they are unavoidable
even in years of depression. Secondly, the longer expenditure has
been running, the more rights and vested interests have grown up
around it. Thirdly, it is a powerful argument in regard to any
service to say that the nation did without it a few years ago, there-
fore it cannot be essential." 4
No qualitative distinctions of social utility are offered as a guide to
retrenchment by this expert committee. Social services are described as
"privileges or benefits for particular classes at the cost of the general
taxpayer."' It thus appears that the committee's "careful balancing of
national interests" means relieving the taxpayer and reducing services
even in the face of popular demand for such governmental functions.
The economic argumentation of the majority report is a justification for
limiting state action for the purpose of easing the taxpayer's burden and
thereby restoring prosperity. But which is the determining considera-
tion?
The arguments advanced by the committee minority are based on a
different set of value judgments. This group believes that government
should be highly responsive. They criticize the majority report as repre-
senting
"a condition of financial irresponsibilities which in fact do not exist
...So far as their strictures concern the principle of ultimate finan-
cial responsibility, what they regard as 'undesirable', we view as
consistent with the right and proper course of democratic govern-
ment and progress. How otherwise shall the people obtain legis-
lative redress of social and economic injustice except through those
who seek their suffrage"?6
"Moreover, we consider that many of the recommendations of our
colleagues would in their operation impose an unfair measure of
sacrifice upon certain large sections of the Community, many of
whom are already feeling with considerable and growing severity the
effects of what has graphically been described as the 'economic bliz-
zard,' but would fail to lay under any comparable contribution others
3. Id., at 14.
4. Id., at 16.
5. Id., at 13.
6. Id., at 228.
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more favourably situated, many of whom are enjoying, to the extent
of their fixed income, effortless benefits from the increased value of
money due to falling prices." 7
How are the interests of the taxpayers, the persons with fixed incomes,
and those possessed of money claims protected by contract, to be bal-
anced in any objective fashion with the welfare of those persons whose
income is too small for the income tax, who work for wages and possess
no money claims? There is little point in criticizing a fiscal policy because
it "attracts votes" unless this argument in itself is likely to win political
support for those advancing it. On the other hand, it is argued that
"at election times those desiring increased expenditure on particular
objects are usually far better organized, far more active and vocal than
those who favor the vague and uninspiring course of strict economy;
and as a result candidates not infrequently find themselves returned to
parliament committed, on a one-sided presentation of a case, to a course
which on fuller knowledge they see to be opposed to the national in-
terests.""
The concept of a fiscal policy designed to promote the economic wel-
fare of the public as a whole is badly shaken when the incidence of a
given policy is faced in terms of the groups actually affected. The gen-
eral welfare concept is of little if any value as a tool of analysis; it is
most effective as an instrument of exhortation. As a battle-cry for ral-
lying sympathy and support to a given proposal it belongs in the same
arsenal with "justice," "equity," and "fairness."
On the other hand, fiscal policy need not necessarily represent the
partial, immediate, and selfish views of narrow groups. Granted the
exercise of reason, restraint, and cooperation on the part of participants
working through an appropriate governmental mechanism, a line of
public policy might be established that would advance the wealth and
happiness of a very large proportion of the population. Although the
"general welfare" concept is often abused, it may still be worth while
to seek policies benefiting a broader rather than a narrow alignment of
interests. A given fiscal policy must relate to the economic welfare of,
for example, bankers or brokers or investors or farmers. One policy may
embrace several of these interests. But no policy can embrace all group
interests unless we assume that there is latent somewhere in our society
an inner unity capable of harmonizing all apparent differences. This
paper assumes the degree of social unity which makes communal life
possible to be of little aid in settling current policy problems.
"Equity" in taxation and expenditures for "the public interest" are
thus concepts that must be analyzed in terms of the groups affected if
7. Id., at 270.
8. Id., at 13.
1938] 727
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
we are to discover what substantive content or meaning these phrases
may have. It is not that these terms are devoid of meaning, but rather
that they have many meanings. It is not that these terms are without use
but rather that they may be put to contrary uses.
The formulation of fiscal policy lies at the dead center of democratic
government. It is the very essence into which is distilled the conflict
between the haves and have-nots. It represents the terms of compromise
between powerful economic forces in the community. Utterly divergent
economic forces are seeking to use the financial machinery of the govern-
ment to promote their own ends.
The essence of the problems comes to this: that fiscal policy neces-
sarily issues from a complex of political forces. What is the standard
to be for guiding policy if we discard the "general welfare" concept as
offering little practical aid except for oratorical purposes? Secretary
Wallace has considered this problem. In his book, New Frontiers,' he
propounds a faith in a society where a continuing balance of interests
supervised by an able bureaucracy will advance "the good life." But what
does this philosophy mean when removed from the discussion plane
of high principle? What are his guides for the substantive framing
of fiscal policy?
Striking a "balance" means that various people are to get their just
due and that some one is to determine the distribution. Order, good-
will and reason all contribute to making the transaction smooth and
pleasant. But who gets what, and why? Basically, the substantive content
of Wallace's theories are most baldly stated in the following excerpt
from recent Senate Committee hearings.
"I think as long as government has given certain advantages to
corporations, to organized farm groups, to organized labor groups,
that it should use some of its powers to see that the unorganized
people at the bottom of the pile are not too hopelessly discriminated
against by the forces of modern society. If we are to have a true
democracy these people must get into position to exercise their part.
They should be in position to earn more money." 10
Here at last is a clear statement of his objective: the public interest calls
for more money in the pockets of the people at the bottom of the pile.
In the final analysis, Secretary Wallace's views seem to result in belief
that through governmental intervention our national economy can be so
altered as to enable the bottom third of the population to earn more
money. And particularly the bottom third of farmers.1 Secretary Wal-
9. WALLACE, NEw FRONIERS, (1934).
10. Hearings before Senate Committee on Appropriations on Emergency Relief Ap-
propriation, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 266.
11. Secretary Wallace has amplified his position thus:
"The question is to find that particular type of taxation, that particular type of
volume of taxation, and that particular type and volume of expenditure which will lead
[Vol. 47: 724
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lace has a definite base for fiscal policy formulation. His task as a poli-
tician, however, is to develop the theory and the formulae that will
make his proposals harmonious with accepted values. It has long been
assumed in some quarters that if the top third of the economic heap
determined fiscal policy, the benefits would trickle down. Secretary
Wallace would reverse the situation. He can anticipate quite a long
discussion.
II.
The prevailing ideology is of vast importance in any effort to analyze
political change. It is the very atmosphere that interest groups must
breathe. In considering the politics of fiscal policy, therefore, the attitude
of people toward their government is an ideological factor of trans-
cendent importance.
From the political point of view the fact must also be accepted that
man in the mass responds to symbols and embraces simple formulae. If
he were other than what he is, the political problem would also be differ-
ent. But to the student of government an essential bit of data is the
emotional response of the public to the clich6s surrounding economic
problems and the public's inability to grasp the refinements of economic
analysis.
There is, I think, a law of political distortion under which economic
facts, as soon as they are used in political debate, lose their original
form and are shaped and over-simplified to achieve some pre-determined
end.'12 Fiscal policy, hence, is discussed rather in terms consistent with
accepted ideology than with actual facts. A government which under-
takes to manipulate the economic affairs of the nation employs symbols
and slogans of the general welfare even though its action really deprives
one group of something for the benefit of another. Much of reality is too
complex to be widely understood, but in most fields the direction of
activity is not dependent upon the approval of a mass of uninformed
individuals.
to the greatest welfare of all the people over a long period of years; or, if I may put
it on this basis, will lead to the greatest net amount of money after paying income
taxes in the hands of the average man.
"I think it would be a very profitable study indeed to inquire into all the ramifica-
tions of taxation and expenditure from the standpoint of net income in the hands of the
average small business men in the smaller towns of this country.
"What taxation policy, what expenditure policy, over a long period of years, taking
into account the situation of this bottom third of the population, taking into account
the State in which our natural resources and our soil fertility find themselves, should
be followed?"
Hearings before the Sub-Coininittee of the House Committee on Appropriations on
the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 7.
12. See the writer's article (1937) 2 J. OF Soc. PHIL 95.
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Business organizations work in an atmosphere encouraging initiation
and frank profit-seeking; government organizations are surrounded by
social attitudes imposing responsibility for action and restraining the
use of discretion. Through the fiction of corporate personality private
business enables directors to handle other people's money as though it
belonged to this personality whose mere organs they are assumed to be.
Directors are the five senses of a legally created "person." Officials are
always thought of as handling other people's money, and hence they have
to be watched. Democratic government is not regarded as a great Levia-
than representing the whole community in organic form. Yet when we
wish to criticize governmental finance we revive the personal view of
the state and point to the need for the government to balance its own
budget as though it were a household.
The government today is using its control of monetary policy, of
taxation, of borrowing, and of lending, to intervene in the whole economy
of the nation. The consequences of this interference are not fully re-
flected in the mere income and outgo of the Treasury, for we are with-
out a balance sheet that shows us the total result of. current fiscal policy.
These fiscal operations transcend the housekeeping of the nation. We
see a huge deficit in dollars and cents. But these figures do not give a
complete picture of national finance. It is not enough to know that
we have spent more money than we have taken in. Unless we know the
consequences of federal spending and the incidence of various taxes, we
cannot tell whether the populace are better or worse off as a result of
what the government has done. When the government uses its legal
controls of economic affairs in order to attain certain social ends, purely
financial standards are inadequate. We use a fiscal term to cloak a social
end. This cloak may appear bright red as a deficit in the budget, but the
narrow bookkeeper's view taken distorts the reality. Understressed is
the fact that taxation and public expenditures may contribute positively
to the wealth and well-being of the nation. Taxes may discourage anti-
social behavior and bring about a distribution of economic goods that
actually promotes productivity. When taxation is not used primarily for
raising revenue, the importance of the tax cannot be judged in terms of
the monies brought in. For example, if the power to tax is used as
the power to destroy, destruction becomes our criterion. If regulation
is attempted through a tax levy, our first concern must be with the extent
of regulation resulting and only incidentally with the amount of money
raised.
In expenditures for public works or in loans to industry the social
consequence of these policies is the significant question. The activity
called "governmental spending" is often treated as an abstract concept
and closely associated with the words "recklessness" and "extravagance."
[Vol. 47: 724
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Sometimes these epithets describe the operation and sometimes not. Pub-
lic expenditures are made for the attainment of such diverse ends that
no one set of standards can be applied in toto, least of all narrowly
financial criteria. Thus, the vast sums allotted to national defense must
ultimately be justified by the imponderables of national policy and in-
ternational relations. Fiscal policies such as the tariff, or subsidies,
preferential or regulatory taxes, stem back to considerations of social
control and a political balancing of interests. Public expenditures may
mean investments yielding returns for generations. Millions spent for
flood control may result not only in billions saved in property values
but also millions saved from flood insurance charges. Public spending
has no meaning in itself; its significance lies in the standards applied.
In the dispute over social aims contestants attempt to discredit spending
in general. The popular distrust resulting makes the actual administration
of fiscal policy unnecessarily difficult. A more forthright facing of social
objectives, if substituted for emotional aversion to the abstract concepts
such as "reckless expenditures" and "unbalanced budgets," would make
possible the more effective management of governmental finance.
Suppose the government should broaden its "capital structure" base;
we would call it increasing the national debt. But why not more debt if
it increases national income? In governmental affairs budget balancing
is thought of usually in terms of economy. On the other hand, a business
can often choose either retrenchment or expansion. Advertising to draw
business may be the best way to balance its budget. No a priori assump-
tions settle the issue. The tendency to think of public finance in terms
of personal expenses is, perhaps, a partial explanation, since for most
individuals greater economy is the only immediately available way of
keeping outgo within income. 3 The excess of outgo over increase is
the fact that appears most clearly in the public budget-the causes are
too confused for the public to grasp. The simplest explanation is to
argue fhat selfish forces raid the Treasury and the government is unable
to say them nay.
"The demand for an immediate budget balance as an essential pre-
liminary to further business recovery" Professor Haig regards as "some-
what disingenuous." "This is really a symbol," he states - "a protest
against waste and a plea for the elimination of unnecessary uncertain-
ties.""4 Professor Haig's analysis seems to come closer to the kernel
of our problem. He eschews the balanced budget formula. It is the
uncertainty that estops business: the fear of making plans because of
13. For a brilliant discussion of attitudes toward budget balancing and of private
vs. public finance, see AaOL, THE FOLrLOX Or CAPrrAus,, (1937) 102-104, 170-174,
and 262-331 passirt.
14. Haig, Facing the Deficit, (June 1936) 24 YAtz Rxv. 701.
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the upset that may be caused by change in the price structure or the
exchange rate. But a balanced budget may or may not reflect a condition
of stability.
Since public confidence is a factor of vast importance in deficit financ-
ing, it might be more important to bolster this attitude than to retrench.
In fact, the withdrawal of government money has lately seemed to have
a very depressing effect on business. Although effective slogans and
language for supporting an expansive fiscal policy are not widely cur-
rent, why not stress the importance of "constructive credit" and "public
investment," "social savings," and the "budgeting of human resources"
or talk of "governmental enterprise," of "protecting posterity" and of
building the basis of "community prosperity" through the development
of national welfare?
Much argumentation is based upon the conception of state action as
being essentially restrictive, negative, regulatory, and unproductive. What
would happen if a more exact and realistic analysis were made of the
assets resulting from governmental spending? Our governmental ac-
counting system treats social services of vast public benefit as heavy
charges against the community. This means that a one-sided picture is
obtained which fosters the unfavorable attitude toward government ex-
penditures. As a formal bookkeeping matter it would, of course, be
exceedingly difficult to assess the value of crime prevention or fire pro-
tection. Such computations have, however, been attempted. The econ-
omic value of educational and recreational facilities is still more elusive
but none-the-less real. Our present trend toward collectivism is evaluated
by the narrow bookkeeping of an individualistic economy. It may be
that the social cost of this trend is greater than its returns. My only
point is that our present system of evaluation throws little light on the
matter one way or the other. Hence, the way in which public finance
is treated, plus the stake that most people feel in it, makes the matter
too important to be left alone and too complicated to be widely~under-
stood.
Government is supposed to be bound by the same principles which
govern the good man. When social need carries the government into
new fields of activity, a theoretical justification is not always ready at
hand. Thus, in a situation where social need dictated spending, a rational
theoretical justification was necessary. Mr. Keynes provided a ready-
made answer for academic critics. He provided a bone of contention
for the intellectual. The homely rustic symbol of "priming the pump"
gave the public a picture to consider while the destitute were cared for.
All governmental action must have a philosophical justification. This
must also be simplified into an acceptable symbol; a rationale is neces-
sary before action.
[Vol. 47: 724
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Though they become involved in verbal contradictions, public men must
say the socially desired thing if they wish to remain in public life." The
ideology through which we view public questions tends to make their
words more important than their deeds. They are judged largely by
their loyalty to community ideals and ritual. Statesmen occupy posi-
tions of symbolic significance. They are expected to stand for the high-
est principles and aspirations of the community. They are judged by
their fidelity to professed social ideals. Conflicts, confusion and recrim-
inations arise when the voters demand that their high elective officials
not only stand for principle but also do something. Such action involves
the give-and-take, the dodge and push, that is taken for granted in
business. If a statesman behaves this way in order to accomplish some-
thing, he becomes a politician.
The increased penetration by governrhent into fields of management
means that officials come trailing clouds of symbols that have little to
do with their concrete responsibility. Confusion lies in failing to dis-
tinguish between problems and our attitude toward these problems. At
the present time the obstacle in the way of a balanced budget is as much
the attitude toward government as more practical considerations.
The facts concerning the effect of a particular tax or the economic
value of a certain expenditure are exceedingly complex. Nevertheless,
since the welfare of individuals or groups may be vitally affected, great
effort must be made to rally a mass of supporters. Here accepted sym-
bols or attractive slogans are more useful than facts. The area is too
broad, too confused, too technical to be grasped. Politicians are called
upon to supply simplifications. Urgent need for generalizations in the
field of fiscal policy tends to remove us far from concrete realities. Some-
thing called a "balanced budget" is set up as the end that must be achieved.
This is attended by various bookkeeping conventions and forms. A
balanced budget comes to be treated as an end in itself. This concept
of a balanced budget is accepted in principle, and then under a dual book-
keeping arrangement the ordinary budget is balanced and an extraordinary
emergency budget unbalanced. Politicians promise to balance the budget
-but later - thus kow-towing to the principle and avoiding the fact.
All "sound" men now take it for granted that an unbalanced budget
is a bad thing and should be rectified. All "humanitarian" men seem
agreed that an unbalanced economy is a bad thing and should be rectified.
They argue that where there is food and where men are hungry the
devices that will satisfy the need should be used. The sound men do
not weaken their position however by discarding the "will of the people"
15. It is a rare Congressman who would declaim in a public gathering as one did
recently in the heat of debate: "I want you to see that this question of balancing the
Budget is not only not vital but it is a piece of nonsense . . . " Rep. Kent Kdllar,
in 80 CONG. REc. 2690 (1936)
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concept. Just as the humanitarians try to keep under the balanced
budget symbol by indirection, 'so do the sound men continue to adhere
to the democratic creed. The danger, they say, lies in governmental
response to the wrong people; the unproductive unemployed voters are
the ones to fear.
Sokolsky writes:
"The peril to democracy is that this body of men and women may
succeed in imposing their will upon those in control of government
so that the government will not be able to free itself of the incubus
of supporting an increasingly large body of non-productive citizens.
. . . No democracy can withstand the corrosive effects of such an
acid. It will eat into the vitals of government finance. It will destroy
free capital by exorbitant taxation. It places a premium upon idle-
ness and vagrancy. It makes a fool of the orderly, productive
citizen."16
Such writers find a moral distinction between the idle and the produc-
tive citizens. They disregard for purposes of their analysis the unmoral
economic forces which transformed productive citizens into vagrants
without regard to personal merit.
Those who would protect democratic government against its own evil
nature conjure up a further danger. What happens when millions of
voters become dependent for their sustenance upon the federal treasury?
"May there not be a temptation to those in control of government to
utilize this vast force to perpetuate themselves in office?"' Ogden Mills
thought that the present administration had already succumbed. The
use of federal funds to control votes and elections was only too evident
to him. "By this I do not necessarily mean the actual purchase of votes,"
he stated. "I mean that a political party which has dedicated itself to
a policy of lavish spending of public moneys, for the sake of spending,
almost inevitably sets up a whole series of vested interests in its con-
tinuance in office - an interest that is totally unrelated to its general
administration of the country's affairs." ''
The Mills' argument is based upon the assumption that certain sound
interests should be in charge of the general administration of the coun-
try's affairs. Efforts to administer the country's affairs in the name of
other interests apparently is undemocratic, especially when these interests
are attracted by a fiscal policy of lavish spending. On the other hand,
many business men have felt that their interests were dependent upon
the continuance in office of the Republican Party. A distinction is drawn,
however, between the vested interest of the citizen who has an estab-
16. Sokolsky, The Political Burden of Relief, (Sept. 1936) 158 ATLANTIC MONTHILY
339.
17. Id., at 339.
18. MILLs, LrBmauIasm FiGnTs ON, (1936) 147.
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lished place in the economic order of society and the mass of citizens
who are less fortunate.
Our ideological confusions about fiscal policy arise perhaps from a
basic political conflict among those on one hand who favor socialization
of wealth for the underprivileged and those who want stimulation or
at least stabilization for encouragement of private enterprise. These
two forces are in political conflict, and basically contradictory public
policies result. Yet this conflict takes place within a political order under
which economic interests are expected peacefully to compete through
governmental channels. The prevalent ideology casts a mist of unreality
over this struggle. Government is the store-house of social aspirations.
Public servants are held to higher standards than those applying to or-
dinary workers and doers. Yet the individuals and institutions sur-
rounded with such high professions of principle are restricted and even
suspected when the time comes for action.
III.
Our attitude toward government shapes its institutions, and these in
turn interact with the demands that groups make. The skeins of atti-
tudes, interests, and institutions cannot be disentangled except arbitrarily
for our present task of analysis. The politics of fiscal policy is inextric-
ably tied up with our institutional set-up. This system is characterized
by: (1) a federal structure based on a constitution of limited powers,
(2) a separation of powers betveen executive, legislative, and judicial
branches which insures an independent area for each of greater or less
extent, (3) a bi-cameral legislative system providing houses of about
equal powers, (4) national political parties built up on a loose confeder-
ation of state organizations -which in turn are bound by sectional
loyalties of a cultural, racial, or traditional kind that may not react
directly to economic motives, (5) an administrative service which for
a long time'to come will be influenced in various agencies by partisan
considerations, (6) a basis of representation that necessitates the supple-
mental activities of private organizations for the defense or promotion
of special interests, (7) an electorate in general more concerned with
family duties and individual concerns than with broad public problems,
(8) a spirit of localism that makes a Representative or Senator depend-
ent for his political career upon pleasing the constituents of one Con-
gressional district or of one state.10
Various writers doubt whether we can properly develop and realize
an adequate fiscal policy under our present governmental structure. "When
the President, with heavy majorities in both houses of the Congress,
19. For a discussion of institutional factors and the public service, see FRinnicir,
PROBLEM OF THE AmERICAN PuBLic SEavicE, (1935) 10.
19381
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
has been unable to secure adherence in such instances to his expenditure
recommendations, there is, indeed, ground for apprehension lest the ex-
periment of deficit financing be wrecked by lack of proper timing and
control of expenditures," Professor Haig states. "Perhaps the pressure
groups of special beneficiaries of government spending will decide the
issue. Perhaps, before deficit financing can be made safe for democracy,
democracy will have to improve its mechanism so that action will be
less influenced by the shortsighted and immediate special interests."'20
If the government is to undertake functions where careful timing is
of essential importance, it seems sensible to provide some form of or-
ganization that can take this into account. Nevertheless, the calendar
and not political expediency or economic conditions determines the timing
of election campaigns. Thus, business cycle theory might dictate the
reduction of government spending just as a campaign for re-election
fell due! It is hardly necessary to elaborate upon the fact that our
government is not well designed for the direction of deficit financing.
The question is, what to do?
One or more of our social or institutional factors may, of course, be
changed, but this seems unlikely and remains unpredictable. For the
present and possibly for a long time to come these conditions constitute
the walls within which the politician must work. Some writers take the
view that this "handicaps" the functioning of a "proper" budget system.
My point is rather that they merely give the setting to the problem that
we are called upon to face. To insist that these conditions must be
changed if we desire an improved scheme of financial control seems to
me prescribing an anatomical alteration in the patient so that his new
suit of clothes will fit.21.
As Hawtrey has well stated:
"The reason why financial policy is so baffling is that expenditure
is not an organic unity, but a mere arithmetical aggregate. Each
separate item in the aggregate has been included on account of its
merits, and if it is to be suppressed or reduced it must be shown to
be less desirable than its rivals."' 22
How can this be demonstrated? Throuagh the persuasive force of superior
reasoning? By an authoritative declaration? By skilled political leader-
ship? The totalitarian concept of the state provides one approach: disci-
pline and power are emphasized. Here is government by different sym-
bols than those used under democracy. Our present institutions are
20. Haig, supra note 14, at 693. See also SCHLxcra, ToWARDs STABILITY, (1934)
200 ff.
21. See for example the criticism of our system of financial control by Bucv,
BUDGETS IN THE GOVERNMENT OF TODAY, (1934) 237-244.
22. HAWTREY, THE EXCHEQUER AND THE CONTROL OF EXPENDITURES, (1921) 68.
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surrounded by such symbols as those justifying checks and balances,
separation of powers, popular responsibility, state rights. These phrases
do not support the organizational changes needed, for example, in a
pump priming program. Working within the framework of democratic
concepts, various scholars have pointed to the advantages of the parlia-
mentary system for the better control of fiscal policy. Here is a system
sustained by the symbols and myths of democracy, yet sufficiently well
integrated within itself to make the executive effective. At any rate,
this seems to be the case in Great Britain. To urge the transference to
the United States of such institutions is to assume that our society and
economy is sufficiently similar to guarantee the same results. A parlia-
mentary system with real cabinet responsibility depends on a strong party
system and a well-organized bureaucracy. These in turn rest upon fac-
tors such as the homogeneity of the population, the nature of the national
economy, social traditions, and the structure of classes.
Institutional factors are, of course, man-created and susceptible to
revision. At the same time this does not mean that they are artificial
establishments; they are now deeply rooted and intertwined. Tearing
up any one would have such unpredictable consequences that we may
well hesitate about altering drastically the system of government. Our
government works as it does, not entirely because the machinery is
cumbersome, but rather because the propelling power is sporadic and the
load is heavy. For example, the difficulties ascribed to federalism would
not all disappear if we eradicated state lines. Sectional interests would
remain; economic development, cultural characteristics and even climatic
and other geographical conditions would attend to that. The rivalries
of sections are at least isolated to some extent within the boundaries of
our states. Local leaders are forced to compose the major part of their
own quarrels. Our federal system means that the ultimate responsibility
for all decision making is not focused in one place. Although the dis-
persion of responsibility causes some delay and does not appeal to men
of strictly logical mind, it at least tempers the intensities of feeling that
arise when the onus of decision making is centered upon one governing
agency or even one individual.
To the extent that the Executive is able to exercise control he gathers
unto himself the onus of deciding between conflicting interests. Under
a system that gives the President a fixed term, focusing responsibility
upon him may create antagonisms that cannot be resolved, since the
President cannot be expected to resign when he loses the support of
Congress.
Our present system has the great virtue of keeping decentralized many
of the conflicts within the community. There is no one point where
the whole government could be endangered, and hence there is less need
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for the concentration of governmental force. Such a system, of course,
makes for confusion and is not highly suited to straight-forward busi-
ness-like management of finance- but government has matters other
than finances to manage. Our present form of government is not to be
judged simply in terms of its ineptness for fiscal control. Hence, the
question is not merely how efficiently do fiscal agencies function, but how
do they do their jobs within the confines of our institutional framework
and in view of all the other purposes that the government is supposed
to realize.
Our institutional forms prevent the underlying social differences of
interest from reaching as sharp a divergence as they would under a
system of government that concentrated responsibility more clearly.
Today no one view of sound fiscal policy can be pushed through. Men
of reason are forced to compromise with men of emotion. No single
political group can control the whole machinery of government. This
is not the best way to realize a logically consistent, policy, but it may
be a fortunate thing in a country as diversified as is the United States.
Changes in the institutional structure which are desirable from one point
of view may be questionable from another.
What are we seeking? Our goal presumably is to develop and apply
a rational fiscal policy acceptable to most of the community. But sup-
pose popular government leads to increasing deficits and ultimate infla-
tion? "The acceptance of the view that unbalanced budgets are danger-
ous, even if at times unreasonable, serves as a check against legislative
excesses."23 Here is the view that if legislators would only believe that
keeping out of debt was more important than representing their con-
stituents all would be well. "Our fear of unbalanced budgets," we are
told, is "a sound conclusion based upon past events . . . If we lose that
fear and in its place accept a belief in the desirability or even in the
safety of deficits, we are probably headed toward a ruinous lesson." Is
this inference correct?2
4
Here is an exhortation to the effect that government spending is a bad
thing presumably because this leads to a change in the nature of property
relations. But whether such a change is in itself undesirable does not
necessarily follow. We can predict a change but we cannot foretell what
the nature of this change will be. Disaster for whom? Must economic
analysis take its stand upon the desirability of preserving "capitalism?"
In facing a long policy of increasing expenditures can we assume a
static condition? Disaster is predicated upon the assumption that the
present economic system will remain static until its "debt limits" are
reached. Whereupon it will pop! This must mean either (1) that there
23. SmrrH, DEFICITS AND DEPRESsroNs, (1936) 170.
24. Id., at 171.
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is a rigid limit to taxation, or (2) that governmental expenditures will
be poured into channels of an unproductive sort that will not make the
country better able to carry the increased burden of taxes entailed. To
the eventualities of chronic depression and eventual inflation could we
not also add increasing collectivism as an equally possible alternative?
We can discover no absolute criteria as to what should be- all we can
hope to do is to provide a mechanism for channelizing pressures and
providing facilities for the formulation and execution of policy that will
keep our institutions responsive to our social needs.
Judgment is passed upon the activities of the government in the
general field of fiscal relationships largely in terms of the "budget." This
device was not intended to meet a broad view of financing. The present
administrative machinery of budgetary control we established to increase
efficiency of operation. Fiscal policy clearly transcends questions of
management. Yet the budget stands as the only summary statement of
all federal fiscal policy. No mechanism can settle automatically questions
of distributive justice. No objective standards are applicable. Such
standards can be developed for management perhaps but not for policy.
Viewed as a political problem, budgeting means interest balancing.
Thus, no clear economic criteria can be applied in deciding whether
millions should be spent on a battleship or on a national park and bird
sanctuary.25 If any scientific adjustment of interests is impossible, we
can at least strive for a clear view of the alternatives before us. Officials
can be made to offer a program. Means can be provided for weighing
the merits of different demands and shortsighted forces can be urged to
seek a longer view. What administrative devices or institutional changes
will encourage this approach?
Insofar as the purely political problem is concerned, all governments
have the basic problem of deciding "who gets what, when and how." They
go about it differently and institutionalize different stages of the process.
The outcome in terms of governmental structure shows striking con-
trasts. An agency that may be provided for by the constitution in one
country may be left to private arrangement in another. Thus, persuasion
and open bargaining characterize the formulation of fiscal policy in this
country. There is a diffusion of responsibility. Differences of opinion
and conflicts of interest that would be smothered in party conclave under
25. As Congressman Luce has stated: 'It is not divided responsibility that makes
a 'scientifically equilibrated budget' impossible; it is the nature of governmenL No
system can secure such a budget; no system ought to secure such a budget. Modem
government tries to meet a thousand social needs. They differ as the pear and the
plum, the tulip and the pansy, the song and the statute. They have no common factor,
no homogeneity, often not even relationship. Only in the roughest way are comparisons
possible. We may say that provision for health is more important than provision for
pleasure, that the development of industry should be preferred to the development of
art; but scientific adjustment is hopeless." LUcE, LcxsLAT=iv Pnonr s, (1935) 357.
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a dictatorship or privately adjusted between officials and interested groups
in Great Britain are bandied about in public debate in the United States.
While we may not hope for an over-all control of fiscal affairs that
will lead us to the Promised Land where milk and honey supplant slumps
and depressions, a partial solution may lie in a more realistic attitude
toward fiscal policy through clarifying some concepts and discarding
others. Other aspects of fiscal policy depend upon the adjustment of
group interests. Finally, appropriate institutional changes may lead to
the readier compromise of differing habits of thought and conflicting
group interests.
Experts in this country have stressed the great possibilities that lie
in developing a central staff agency concerned with general financial
planning. Fiscal policy would lie within the special province of this staff.
This group of experts might study our financial problems and provide
the Chief Executive with a program that might assist him in assuming
leadership and in bringing Congress into line. This purpose might also
be assisted by making the Budget Bureau a more effective agency. Today
we have no critical scrutiny of continuing appropriations, no adequate
questioning as to whether a service has outlived its usefulness. When a
department seeks a marked increase in appropriations or plans to under-
take some new function, the President's consent is first sought. On these
more important problems the Chief Executive needs assistance. Many
officials in Washington say that the greatest need is for some single,
over-all co6rdination and that the White House is the logical place for
this. Yet here today a "catch-as-catch-can" condition prevails. The secre-
tariat is primarily concerned with press and congressional contacts. An
appropriate agency for the study and broad consideration of national
fiscal policies is lacking. The Bureau of the Budget was designed to
introduce methods of business management into governmental affairs.
The problem now has transcended that of mere economy; it has entered
the realm of high policy.
In order successfully to administer fiscal policy authority and flexi-
bility are needed. But authority must lie at the source of power. We
cannot desert the politicians in Congress for the experts in the Bureau
of the Budget. If the two cannot be brought together, then Congress
must get its own technicians. Fiscal policy, by its very complexity,
requires the aid and advice of technically trained men. The appearance
of legislative councils in various states is one recognition of the need
for the more effective implementation of legislative planning. Congress
has found the staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxa-
tion a valuable technical aid in framing legislation. It may be that a
Joint Committee on Expenditures could perform a similar function for
the Appropriations Committee. It must also be remembered that in the
United States the separation between the executive and legislative brancies
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makes the direction of financial policy all the more difficult. This has
been recognized in recent proposals.2
While it is arguable that for certain reasons, such as providing a broad
basis of responsibility and maintaining a federal structure, bi-cameralism
is desirable, the conclusion does not follow that for other purposes, such
as fiscal control, the two chambers should not be brought closer together.
Thus, little is gained in thinking of the separation of powers or separa-
tion of functions as a principle of government. It is nothing more than
a form of organization suitable for some functions and unsuitable for
others.
To recognize bi-cameralism, the separation of powers, or the duality
between central and state governments as having a political justification
is to further recognize chasms that must be bridged rather than eradi-
cated. A closer co~peration between the Bureau and the Appropriations
Committee would be one more way to do this. Budget officials have
supplied information and, on rare occasions, even attended executive
committee meetings. The significance of this participation depends largely
upon the make-up of the Appropriations Committee at any one time.
When the House Appropriations Committee was composed of representa-
tives of long experience, they were able to scruffnize requests for appro-
priation with critical understanding. The uncertain tenure of Congress-
men means that a dependable check by the legislature cannot be relied
upon. At the present time the Bureau of the Budget never calls on the
Chairmen of the Appropriations sub-committees who will later pass on
specific budget estimates. -7 Clearly there is room for a higher degree
26. For example, in June, 1937, Senator Byrd introduced a bill (S. 2530) "relating
to the financial administration of the federal government." This bill proposed to set
up a Committee on Financial Administration composed of the Chairmen of the Senate
Finance and Appropriation Committees and the House Committees on Appropriations
and on Ways and Means, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Bureau of
the Budget and an auditor general. This committee would "study problems requiring
co5peration among the several agencies of the government with respect to any matter
of budgetary or financial administration . . . with a view to assessing proper integration
of activity and authority among such agencies with respect to such problems:' Agencies
composed of busy officials serving ex officio seldom accomplish much. Moreover, the
ultimate success of any such group would be vastly affected by the interplay of the
personalities represented. Senator Byrd's bill is, nevertheless, a significant recognition
of a weakness in our system.
27. "The intimate connection between the work of the Bureau of the Budget and
that of the two Appropriation Committees of Congress is evident A worldng arrange-
ment has never been developed among these three agencies, however, by which the
investigations of the Budget Bureau could serve the purposes of the Appropriations
Committee. Provision for such co~peration is made by Section 212 of the Budget and
Accounting Act which provides:
'the Bureau shall, at the request of any committee of either House of
Congress having jurisdiction over revenue or appropriations, furnish the
committee such aid and information as it may request.'"
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of co6peration. Yet rivalries between Congress and administrative agen-
cies are not easily set aside.2
s
If our analysis of the politics of fiscal policy is correct, no over-all
or sweeping reforms are likely to succeed. Congress cannot be expected
readily to increase the President's authority at its own expense. Hence,
even so defensible a reform as the item veto has received little support
in Congress. 9 Various presidents from the time of Hayes have toyed
with the idea. The item veto, however, would enable the President to
strike at specific appropriations and thus reach back into Congressional
districts. This might eliminate pork barrel legislation, but it would also
give the Chief Executive one means of weakening Congressmen on their
home grounds. Local support means the political life or death of Con-
gressmen. They will hardly welcome a whip that may be applied to their
own backs.30
Under our system of government *and within our climate of opinion
problems of fiscal policy cannot be successfully approached through the
exercise of broad over-all planning and clear responsible authority. To
achieve this would necessitate not only a change in the form of govern-
ment but what is more difficult, a change in our attitude toward govern-
ment. Neither our institutions nor our ideology seem suited to meeting
in straight-forward and fore-sighted fashion present questions of fiscal
"Opportunity has never really existed for the full utilization of this provision by
the committees of Congress owing to the small staff of the Bureau and its restricted
scope of operations. On an expanded basis, however, as herein proposed, the Bureau
of the Budget could become an invaluable tool of both revenue and appropriation com-
mittees through its records of the rates of expenditure and accruing obligations, as
well as through its studies of administrative methods and costs."
Investigation of Executive Agencies of the Government, Report to the Select Con-
mittee to Investigate the Executive Agencies of the Government, No. 5 (1937).
28. Hearings before House Committee on Appropriations on the Second Deficiency
Appropriation, U. S. House of Representatives, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 704-706.
29. See N. Y. Times, January, 1938, for date of efforts to grant this power to
the President. Jan. 12, 1938, p. 2: House grants to the President item veto power
on appropriation measures as an economy move; Jan. 15, 1938, p. 2: Item veto elim-
ination is demanded by House Appropriation body; Jan. 18, 1938, p. 1: Senate Com-
mittee bars Item Veto Power.
30. Even the practice of giving the Chief Executive discretionary power to allot
lump-sum appropriations, while justified by emergency conditions, meets with strong
criticism in Congress. The present exercise of this power has aroused protests against
undue executive authority, such as the following: "If the executive department be-
comes stronger and stronger at the expense of the other two branches of government,
doubtless discretionary appropriations will take on the nature of permanency . . . On the
other hand, if the traditional American system of Jefferson and Lincoln can prevail
and federal legislators can regain their freedom from political pressure to do their
duty as laid down in the Constitution, then the Constitutional system will be restored."
Senator Vic Donahey, of Ohio, in letter of June 9, 1937, to Editor of United States
News, Washington, D. C.
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policy. This does not mean that careful economic analysis is futile or
that all planning efforts should be abandoned. It does mean that the
fruits of such forethought are not suited for submission to Congress
as a statement of "what should be." This can only be finally determined
as the result of careful compromise. The legislature may well become
impatient with carefully drawn logical blue-prints while struggling to
find the actual conditions under which men will agree to work together.
Because of the very nature of his task the politician cannot follow a
priori schemes no matter how logically conceived and technically defensi-
ble. Nor are the political difficulties in adjusting differences due solely
to the stupidity or the selfishness or the irrational nature of man. Ob-
stacles perhaps more severe arise from the technician blind to the limits
of his special competence, from the moralist unmindful of the manifold
interpretations of justice or social welfare, from the man of reason dis-
dainful of the power of emotional considerations. It is just as important
for the expert to see his limitations as it is for the laymen to see his.
The latter is reminded of his ignorance by the mysteries of technical
terms and involved theory; the former has no clear boundary stones to
show when he leaves his technical skill to follow his private hunch.
As the political value of compromise as an end in itself is realized,
the task of carefully adjusting divergent group interests in concrete cases
can be tackled. Exhortation will then become less persuasive. Energy
can be turned from the defense of abstract principles to the invention
of organizations appropriate to do a job. Here is a task worthy of
the expert.
We have already shown much ingenuity and inventiveness in admin-
istrative forms. For example, the Farm Credit Administration has ap-
parently been successful in devising a system where decision making is
decentralized, and local units are integrated with the community served.
Here is an approach to the political and administrative aspects of fiscal
policy that seems promising for the future. Under the Farm Credit
Administration, "the local association and the district units are operated
as business corporations. Consequently, their receipts are income from
which is paid the costs of making the loans and other operating ex-
penses.""1 Borrowers share in the control and ownership of the lending
institution and participate in any earnings. It is contemplated that far-
mer-borrowers will eventually acquire full ownership. The Farm Credit
Administration is a co6rdinating agency that grew to meet a definite
need. There were four or five agencies already extending credit to the
farmers. Cotrdination was clearly and definitely needed since there were
activities in the same field that had to be related. The Farm Credit
31. Hearinqs before the Sub-Connnittee of the House Committee on Appropriations.
on the Agricultural Department Appropration Bill, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1936) 1336.
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Administration took over this task. Cobrdination and co~peration thus
grew from the limited to the more general, developing from the needs
of those served. They in turn are gradually to assume an increasing
responsibility. This is evolutionary and pragmatic administration.
Another example is the Federal Reserve System. In an economy such
as ours there seems to be a need for a strong credit structure. Yet there
has also been a persistent distrust of centralized financial power. The
federal government was not to be trusted with the establishment of a
Bank of the United States, and business was left to develop its own
integration through "finance capitalism." Our banking system has been
torn between the public need of Wall Street and the public fear of Wall
Street. Over a long period we have attempted to develop a monetary
authority expert in nature and removed from the more direct influence
of those seeking limited and immediate objectives. The Federal Reserve
System has a relatively independent and flexible organizational form.
Here is a skillfully contrived interrelation between the private banking
system and government officials. It has evolved to its present form
in the face of a public unwilling to sanction in organized form the power
of money joined with the power of government. Yet the social need
for such a service was too strong to be denied. Cannot an agency for
fiscal policy be devised as pragmatically sound as our monetary authority?
The problem must be approached, however, through the organizational
forms in which the community has confidence.
Long-distance planning boards composed of experts are too far re-
moved from public responsibility to have much political significance.
Co6rdination is a method rather than an aim. It has little meaning unless
it is related directly to agencies actually in conflict. The interests of
men in limited fields and in particular cases must first be clarified and
understanding must develop within a group with related interests. Thus,
until the farmers themselves know what they want, Congress cannot de-
vise a lasting solution for their problems. Labor must come to terms
with labor before administrative forms for managing employer-employee
relations can be effective.
Political issues are not disputes between reasonable men but conflicts
of interests between human beings. Fiscal policy must reckon with
conflicts and irrational beliefs. The general public can hardly be expected
to take a long-term view of fiscal policy; nor is it likely that selfish inter-
ests will become unselfish if enough publicists appeal to them through
the light of reason to mend their ways. Their ways are well insulated
from outside logistic attack by reams of theory concocted by their own
apologists. There are victories in the battles between ideals, but the
Goddess of Reason has proved herself an undiscriminating camp-fol-
lower.
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The clash of ideologies arises largely from undue emphasis upon
"principles" rather than attention to "methods." The thoughtful man
should consider particular taxes rather than "taxation" in general. He
has no business "believing" or disbelieving in over-all concepts such as
"deficit finance" or a "balanced budget." These abstract phrases are
more useful for exhortation than for analysis. In other words, emphasis
should be shifted from the vindication of abstractions to the study of
concrete data and to the discovery of administrative devices that will
get the job done. Is our ideology still fluid and evolving new concepts
to meet new needs? Are our institutions sufficiently flexible? Political
analysis has a task in assisting this process of adjustment through criti-
cism, exploration, experimentation, and the creation of new patterns of
thought and of administration.
The politician must consider how he can pursue a course that %ill
redound most nearly to the welfare of all and at the same time please
those particular interests whose support he needs in order to remain in
office. He has as weapons the ideas, ideals, symbols, slogans, principles,
and formulae by means of which public policy is debated. The success-
ful politician is a skilled manipulator of these symbols. His strength
rests in his sldll as an adjustor of human relations. In the formulation
and administration of fiscal policy there is a need for both the expert and
the politician, for both the technician and the man of compromise.
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